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The analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoff between unilateral effects and 
efficiency gains. The article examines the role of uncertainty (on the efficiency gains) in this 
tradeoff. Common wisdom is that the antitrust authorities should be very cautious about 
random gains. Our results show that dismissing efficiency gains on the sole ground that they 
are uncertain would not be theoretically founded. Indeed, the attitude towards uncertainty 
depends on the curvature of the social objective function. We exhibit a number of situations 
where the objective is convex in the efficiency gains, implying that competition authorities 
should welcome the risk for a given expectation of efficiency gains. Implications for 
empirical merger analysis are exposed. 
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This article reexamines the welfare tradeoﬀs put forward by Williamson (1968) when eﬃ-
ciency gains are uncertain. To this end, we consider horizontal mergers that create market
power, but at the same time yield cost economies (or losses) of random magnitude.
In the modern antitrust langage, the variation of Nash equilibrium prices following the
alteration of market structure is often referred to as “unilateral eﬀects”. These eﬀects have
been recognized for a long time by U.S competition authorities. Section 2.2 of the 1992 Hor-
izontal Merger guidelines is entitled “Lessening of competition through unilateral eﬀects”.
On the other side of the Atlantic ocean, the 1989 European Community Merger Regulation
had been criticized by economists and practitioners because it was not clear that the prohi-
bition criterion (creation or strengthening of a dominant position) encompassed unilateral
eﬀects. In January 2004, the substantive test has been reworded, so as to unambiguously
ﬁll the gap.
As regards eﬃciencies, it is fair to say that they are now widely taken into account
by competition authorities, even though diﬀerences in the standards of proof may subsist.
Section 4 of the U.S. Merger Guidelines, which is devoted on eﬃciencies and has been revised
in 1997, recognizes that “the primary beneﬁt of mergers to the economy is their potential
to generate such eﬃciencies” and acknowledges their potentially pro-competitive impact:
“Eﬃciencies generated through merger can enhance the merged ﬁrm’s ability and incentive
to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new
products.” In Europe, a rather skeptical view about eﬃciency gains seems to prevail. The
2004 EC Regulation imposes high standards regarding eﬃciency gains which are referred
to as “development of technical and economic progress”: they are taken into account only
“provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.”
Having opened the scope for an eﬃciency defence, competition authorities emphasize the
issue of uncertainty:
Eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the
information relating to eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging
ﬁrms. Moreover, eﬃciencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the
merging ﬁrms may not be realized.
(U.S. Merger Guidelines sec. 4)
This quotation highlights two distinct informational features: asymmetry and imper-
fection. First, merging parties, arguably, know more about potential eﬃciency gains than
competition authorities. Second, even if all the information known to the merging ﬁrms
were available to the authorities, there would remain a lot of uncertainty about the re-
alization and the magnitude of the eﬃciency gains. During the merger implementation,
ﬁrms try to achieve cost reductions but this process is random and more or less successful.
Eﬃciency losses (caused, for instance, by clashes between corporate cultures) cannot even
be ruled out.
Departing from most of the existing literature, which has studied implementation issues
under asymmetric information (see for instance Besanko and Spulber (1993)), we concen-
trate on imperfect information in a simple framework where (i) the decision to merge is
2exogenous, as well as the eﬃciency gains; (ii) the objectives of society and of the compe-
tition authority are perfectly aligned ; the expectation of a weighted sum of consumers’
surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts is maximized. Following Deneckere and Davidson (1985), most of
the analysis considers mergers in a multi-product industry under price diﬀerentiation and
constant marginal costs of production. To check the robustness of our results, we examine
some cases with homogenous goods, in particular Cournot competition, as in Farrell and
Shapiro (1990).
In general, the objective is a non linear function of the eﬃciency gains. Even though
society is risk-neutral with respect to revenues and utility, it should not be indiﬀerent to
the uncertainty aﬀecting eﬃciencies. To understand the social attitude towards this risk,
the article endeavors to characterize the curvature of the objective.
Surprisingly, consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts turn out to be convex functions of
eﬃciency gains in many situations, implying that uncertainty should be welcomed by com-
petition authorities. In particular, this is true as soon as demand functions are linear in
prices, for any merger and any pre- and post-merger market structure, with price com-
petition as well as with Cournot competition. No (e.g. symmetry) assumption on top
of the linearity is required for this result to hold. Turning to nonlinear demand func-
tions, we specialize to two polar cases: mergers to monopoly (strong unilateral eﬀects) and
Bertrand competition with homogenous products (no unilateral eﬀect). In the former case,
the monopoly proﬁt is always convex; symmetry and an additional restriction (met, for
instance, by CES demand systems) are needed for consumers’ surplus to be convex. For
a Logit demand system, total welfare is convex in eﬃciency gains while consumers’ sur-
plus can be either concave or convex depending on the value of the underlying parameters.
Under Bertrand competition (and any demand function), consumers’ surplus cannot raise
after a merger. Yet, uncertainty might still be welcomed if the antitrust authorities put
enough weight on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Finally, when ﬁrms compete in quantity and costs are
asymmetric, the consumers’ surplus is convex in eﬃciency gains for a large class of demand
functions (and for an arbitrary number of outsiders).
These examples certainly do not imply that the convexity property is generic. The
curvature of the social objective depends on the speciﬁcs of each case, in particular on the
functional form of the demand system. Yet, our analysis shows that the speciﬁcation chosen
in econometric studies may condition the implicit attitude towards uncertain eﬃciency
gains. We elaborate on the implications of our results for empirical merger analysis in the
last section.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the competition
framework in which the merger takes place and discusses the merger assessment under un-
certainty about eﬃciency gains. Section 3 solves the linear case. Section 4 analyzes mergers
to monopoly under few restrictions on demands. Section 5 deals with Bertrand competi-
tion with homogeneous products. Section 6 extends the analysis to Cournot competition.
Section 7 presents some implications of the results for merger control in practice, with a
particular emphasis on the use of econometric models.
32 Framework
In this section, we introduce various notations and assumptions to describe a merger in a
multi-products ﬁrms industry under constant marginal costs of production.
Competitive environment: Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of all brands. We use
the index I for the merging parties and J for the outsiders. The structure of the industry
before the merger is described by a partition of N into l+r subsets: {I1,...,Il,J1,...,Jr}.
The structure of the industry after the merger is described by a partition of N in 1+r
ﬁrms: {I,J1,...,Jr}, where I =
Sl
i=1 Ii denotes the set of brands owned by the merged
entity. Thus, l is the number of merging parties, r the number of outsiders.
Costs and eﬃciency gains: Before and after the merger, all goods are produced at
constant marginal cost. Let ck (k = 1 to n) denote the marginal cost of brand k before
the merger. Without any loss of generality, the post-merger marginal costs of the merging
ﬁrms can be noted: (1 − γi)ci, with γi ≤ 1.
In most of the paper, we suppose, for simplicity, that eﬃciency gains are one-dimensional,1
that is, they can be represented by a real-valued random variable γ. We do not want, how-
ever, to assume that the gains are proportional to the pre-merger marginal cost ci of each
brand i. To avoid this restriction, we introduce nonnegative numbers λi with maxI λi = 1,
and assume that the gains are proportional to λici. In other words, the post-merger mar-
ginal costs of the new entity are
ci (γ) = (1 − λiγ)ci, i ∈ I. (1)
If each variety beneﬁts similarly from the eﬃciency gains, then λi = 1 for all i. But
marginal costs might vary diﬀerently: for instance, only one product could beneﬁt from the
eﬃciencies, that is, only one λi could be positive.
Since the costs of each variant must remain nonnegative, we have: γ ≤ 1. The merger
allows to reduce marginal costs when 0 < γ ≤ 1; it deteriorates the productivity when
γ < 0 (eﬃciency losses). It does not aﬀect the outsiders’ costs. After the merger, the value
of the random variable γ is realized and becomes common knowledge.
Demand: We follow the standard assumption that all consumers have the same marginal
utility for money, which allows to aggregate their preferences and postulate the existence
of a representative consumer.2 For k = 1 to n, let pk denote the price of variant k,
p = (p1,...,pn)
0 the column vector of all prices, xk ≥ 0 the quantity chosen by the
consumers, and x the vector of all quantities. Consumers’ surplus is:
V (p) = max
x

U (x) − p0x

(2)
The utility function U does not have to be symmetric in x1,..., xn. The functions U and
V are assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable.
Remark 1. Consumer’s surplus V is convex in the price vector p.
1Some results hold with multidimensional gains. See Remark 2 in Section 3.
2See Blackorby et al. (1978)
4In economic terms, consumers beneﬁt more from a price reduction than they suﬀer from
an increase in price. This eﬀect comes from their reaction to price changes. Facing a price
fall (resp. rise), they increase (resp. reduce) the quantity purchased, which exacerbates
(resp. mitigates) the gain (resp. loss).
Formally, Remark 1 follows from V being a maximum of aﬃne functions. Moreover,
standard duality results in convex analysis (see Rockafellar (1996)) show that, given a
convex indirect utility function V (p), there exists a (unique) concave direct utility U(x)
satisfying (2). It follows that the convexity of V is necessary and suﬃcient for consistency
with a well-posed consumer’s problem. In the remainder of the article, we work with V
rather than with U.
The demand functions follow from Roy’s identity:
Dk (p) = −
∂V
∂pk
(p) = −Vpk, k = 1,...,n
or in matrix notation: D = −Vp, where D =
 
D1,D2,...,Dn0. Throughout, we will use
a subscript to denote diﬀerentiation with respect to prices.




(pi − ci (γ))Di (p) =
 






where mI denotes the vector of margins for the products owned by the merged ﬁrm. Using










DJ, J = J1,...,Jr.
Oligopoly game: After the realization of γ, competition takes place under complete
information.3 Except in Section 6, ﬁrms compete in prices with diﬀerentiated products.
They choose simultaneously the prices of their brands. A similar situation has been analyzed
in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), who, however, mainly focused on the proﬁtability of the
merger.
Throughout the paper, we assume that, before and after the merger, the Nash equi-
librium exists and is unique. As our focus is not on entry/exit decisions,4 we restrict our
attention to interior Nash equilibria: demand for each good is positive in equilibrium. In all
speciﬁc examples under consideration, we provide suﬃcient conditions for these properties
to hold.
3On the contrary, Banal-Estañol (2005) and Amir, Diamantoudi, and Xue (2003) consider games where
the outsiders do not know γ at the time of production, which gives an informational advantage to the
merging parties.
4Werden and Froeb (1998) and Spector (2003) analyze the eﬀects of mergers taking into account entry
considerations.
5Objective function: We use p(γ) = (p1 (γ),...,pn (γ))0 and S(γ) to denote the prices
and the consumers’ surplus, viewed in (post-merger) equilibrium as functions of γ:
S (γ) = V (p(γ)).
For any function u of γ, we use ˙ u and ¨ u to note its ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect
to γ. For instance, the eﬀect of a marginal increase in γ on the price of good k is denoted
˙ pk (γ). We interpret the vector −˙ p as the (marginal) pass-on rate of eﬃciency gains.
Society’s objective, also seen as a function of the magnitude of eﬃciency gains, is a
weighted sum of consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts:




with K = I,J1,...,Jr and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It is often assumed that antitrust authorities put
more weight on consumers’ surplus than on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. (Theoretical foundations can be
found in Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Neven and Röller (2005).) Here, however, we do
not a priori restrict to α ≥ 1/2.
Existence of a critical threshold: Given a weight α, it is natural to ask whether there
exists a critical threshold 0 < ˆ γα ≤ 1 such that




α denotes the value of the weighted welfare at the pre-merger Nash equilibrium.
Empirical studies often contain estimates of such thresholds. For example, Nevo (2000),
Table 7 page 414, estimates ˆ γ1/2 for a number of actual and hypothetical mergers. See
also Werden (1996), who expresses ˆ γ1 as a function of diversion ratios. In Section 7, we
elaborate on the use of econometric studies for merger assessment when eﬃciency gains are
uncertain.
In theory, the existence of the threshold ˆ γα does not follow from simple general assump-
tions. The existence would be guaranteed if it were true that (i) a merger without eﬃciency
gains always reduces the objective: Wα(0) < W
pre
α , (ii) the objective Wα always increases
in γ and (iii) 100 % gains are always suﬃcient to raise the objective: Wα(1) > W
pre
α .
Unfortunately, these properties do not hold in general.
First, when ﬁrms compete in price and varieties are strategic complements, it is indeed
true that a merger without eﬃciency gains raises prices, reduces consumers’ surplus and
increases the proﬁts of the merged entity and of each outsider (unilateral eﬀects). In
our notations: W1(0) < W
pre
1 . This property does not hold, however, for total welfare
(α = 1/2). Even when goods are strategic complements, a merger without eﬃciency gains
can raise total welfare (see Appendix A.1). Second, the monotonicity of the objective
function Wα is not guaranteed. Appendix A.3 shows that the total welfare can even decrease
with eﬃciency gains. Third, 100 % gains are sometimes not suﬃcient to oﬀset the unilateral
eﬀects. This happens, for instance, with zero (or very small) marginal costs. The Logit
case studied in Section 4 yields a less obvious example.
6If a threshold ˆ γα does not exist, the tradeoﬀ is trivial: irrespective of the magnitude of
the eﬃciency gains, the merger is either beneﬁcial or detrimental. We concentrate on the
only case of interest in which ˆ γα exists. In the following sections, we discuss the existence
of ˆ γα in each speciﬁc situations under consideration. For deterministic eﬃciency gains, say
γ = γ, the assessment of the merger is straightforward. If ˆ γα > γ, the merger is blocked,
while if γ > ˆ γα, the merger is welcomed.
Decision under uncertainty: The article investigates the role of uncertainty of eﬃciency
gains in the tradeoﬀ between unilateral eﬀect and eﬃciency gains. We assume that society is
risk neutral with respect to consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁt, i.e. it maximizes Eγ(Wα).
Suppose antitrust authorities only know the average value of γ, and make their decision
based only on the comparison of ˆ γα with Eγ. When the objective is globally convex or
concave,5 such a decision rule may lead to the rejection (resp. acceptation) of welfare
enhancing (resp. decreasing) mergers, i.e. to type I (resp. II) errors, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Merger assessment under limited information
Wα is globally
convex in γ concave in γ
Merger is blocked ( ˆ γα > Eγ) Type I errors may occur No error
Merger is cleared ( ˆ γα < Eγ) No error Type II errors may occur
Of course, the relevant comparison is between ˆ γα and γ
CE
α , where γ
CE
α denotes the
certainty equivalent of the lottery γ for Wα(.), that is, Wα (γ
CE
α ) = Eγ(Wα). If ˆ γα < γ
CE
α ,
the merger enhances welfare, while if ˆ γα > γ
CE
α , welfare is reduced. The computation of
γ
CE
α would, however, require the knowledge of the entire distribution of γ.
Preliminary results on the consumers’ surplus:
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the consumers’ surplus write respectively
˙ S(γ) = −
X
˙ pk (γ)Dk = −D0 ˙ p = (Vp)
0 ˙ p
and











¨ pk (γ)Dk = ˙ p0Vpp ˙ p − D0¨ p. (3)
5In general, only local properties can be derived. Noting with γ the mean value and σ
2 the variance of
γ, it is readily conﬁrmed that






2 goes to zero. In particular, consider a merger such that Wα(γ) = W
pre
α and σ
2 is small. The merger
should be accepted if ¨ Wα (γ) > 0, rejected if ¨ Wα (γ) < 0.
7Consumers’ surplus S depends on γ through the price vector p. The uncertainty on
γ translates into uncertainty on p, which tends to make S convex in γ, since the indirect
utility is convex in price (˙ p0Vpp ˙ p ≥ 0). This channel also involves the curvature of p(γ),
though. If the pass-on rate increases with γ (¨ p ≤ 0), the range of prices is shifted downwards
compared to a constant pass-on rate, which reinforces the direct eﬀect, implying that S is
unambiguously convex. With a decreasing pass-on rate, the price-shifting eﬀect is negative
and the sign of ¨ S is indeterminate. In the remainder of the paper, however, we exhibit a
number of cases where the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
Preliminary results on ﬁrms’ proﬁts:
The proﬁt of an outsider J varies with γ only due to the variation of the prices of the
other ﬁrms. In Appendix B, we express the second derivative of an outsider’s proﬁt as















HH ˙ pH + ΠJ
H ¨ pH. (4)
Due to the concavity of ΠJ, the ﬁrst term in (4) is positive. As for consumers’ surplus,
it is an heterogeneity eﬀect: other things being equal, the expected proﬁt of an outsider,
who can choose prices along its best reply map, increases when its competitors’ prices vary
randomly around a given mean. Yet, when the prices of J’s competitors ﬂuctuate, there is,
also, a direct eﬀect of J’s proﬁt ΠJ
HH through the curvature of J’s demand function w.r.t.
its competitors’ prices. Finally, a price-shifting eﬀect is also present: intuitively, ΠJ
H > 0
and the sign of this eﬀect is positive when competitor prices are shifted upward (¨ pH ≥ 0).
As regards the curvature of the insider’s proﬁt function, the same terms are at play
(see the ﬁrst line of (19) in Appendix B). There are, however, two additional terms coming







−1 VII˙ cI, which is always nonnegative. It is a monopoly eﬀect: a
monopoly’s proﬁt is convex w.r.t its constant marginal cost. That is, other things being
equal, the insider would like its marginal cost cI to ﬂuctuate rather than being constant.
Under oligopolistic competition, however, these ﬂuctuations bring about reactions in out-
siders’ prices, which generate the other eﬀects.
3 Linear demand system
The linear demand system is widely used to model price competition. Theorists refer to
it when they need a closed form equilibrium. Empiricists also use it to estimate demand
(see, for instance, Pinkse and Slade (2004)). Here we use the most general version of the
linear demand model. We impose the minimal restrictions necessary to ensure the strategic
complementarity and the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Unlike earlier
works (Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Section 5.4 of Motta (2004)), we do not limit
our analysis to symmetric costs or demand systems. In particular, we do not restrict to
Bertrand-Shubik demands (see Shubik and Levitan (1980)).
The consumers’ surplus rewrites as




8where A is a positive (constant) vector of size n and B = (bhj)h,k ∈N is a (constant) matrix
of size n.
According to Remark 1, the matrix B must be symmetric negative semi-deﬁnite. In what
follows, we make the additional assumption that B is nonsingular. These conditions are
satisﬁed when B is a symmetric diagonally dominant matrix with: bhh < 0 and
P
k6=h |bhk| <
|bhh| for all h = 1 to n (see Jacob (1990), pp. 240-241). These inequalities imply that if
the prices of all varieties increase by the same amount, then all demands decrease. We do
not, however, restrict the analysis to this particular case. Throughout, we shall rely only
on B being symmetric negative deﬁnite. The demand function, given by Roy’s identity, is
D(p) = −Vp =
 
DI,DJ1,...,DJr0
= A + Bp.
Let DK
K denote the submatrix (bhk)h,k ∈K. After the merger, the ﬁrst order conditions for
ﬁrm K = I,J1,...,Jr write
DK + DK
KmK = 0. (5)
Since the matrices DK
K are deﬁnite negative, the second-order conditions of the ﬁrms’ max-
imization problems are satisﬁed. In Appendix C.1, we solve for the best reply maps, which
are implicitly given by (5), and for the equilibrium prices. Next, we turn to the main result
of this section.
Proposition 1. When the demand system is linear in prices, all equilibrium prices are
linear functions of γ (that is, ¨ p = 0) and, therefore, consumers’ surplus is strictly convex in
γ. In addition, all proﬁt functions (that is, of the merged entity as well as of each outsider)
are convex in γ. As a result, Wα is strictly convex in γ.
Proof. If (for all h, k) Dh is linear in pk, then the ﬁrst order condition system is linear in
prices and in γ. Therefore the equilibrium price is linear in γ. (Its expression is given by
(21) in Appendix C.1.) Equation (3) and ¨ p = 0 yield: ¨ S = (˙ p)
0 Vpp ˙ p. Since ˙ p is not zero6
and Vpp = −B is symmetric positive deﬁnite, we have: ¨ S > 0.
Next, we prove the convexity of the proﬁt functions. Using the ﬁrst order conditions (5),











Therefore, using the symmetry of DK



















is symmetric positive, we have that ¨ ΠK ≥ 0 for all K.
Proposition 1 emphasizes that in the linear case the objective function of the antitrust
authorities (which can be any combination of consumers’ surplus and proﬁts) is convex.
Therefore, whenever the linearity assumption is realistic, the authorities should not be
afraid of uncertainty. On the contrary, uncertainty should be welcomed and ﬁrms’ should
6See (22) in Appendix C.1.
9be encouraged to provide veriﬁable evidence about the variance of the eﬃciency gains and
not only about its mean value. This result is obtained for any structure of the industry. That
is, the merged entity as well as any outsider might control several brands. No symmetry
assumption is required.
Proposition 1 does not rely on the assumption that eﬃciency gains are proportional
to a scalar γ. Indeed, it generalizes to multidimensional eﬃciency gains, as shown in the
following remark (proved in Appendix C.3).
Remark 2. Let γ = (γ1,...,γl)
0, and assume that after the merger ci (γ) = (1 − γi)ci, i ∈
I. The consumers’ surplus and the proﬁt of each ﬁrm are convex functions of the eﬃciency
gain vector γ.
To end this section, we discuss the monotonicity of Wα (γ). The linearity of demand
does not ensure that Wα is a increasing function of γ. Yet, provided that a simple technical
condition is satisﬁed, Lemma 1 (see Appendix C.2 for a proof) shows that W1 in increasing.
That is, consumers unambiguously beneﬁt from an increase in γ.
Lemma 1. Suppose that goods are strategic complements and the best reply map is a con-
traction. Then all equilibrium prices are decreasing with γ (˙ p ≤ 0). Consumers’ surplus is
an increasing function of γ. Outsiders’ proﬁts decrease with γ.
Yet, even under the assumptions of the lemma, the insider’s proﬁt may decrease with
γ, as shown by the example detailed in Appendix A.2. Therefore, if a weight large enough
is put on ﬁrms, Wα can be decreasing. Looking more closely at the total welfare (α = 1/2),
we compute:
2 ˙ W1/2 = ˙ S +
X
K


















Under the assumptions of the Lemma 1, the last term in (8) is negative: as far as the
goods controlled by the outsiders are concerned, outsiders lose more than consumers gain
from a higher eﬃciency of the new entity. The ﬁrst term being always positive,7 the sign
of ˙ W1/2 is indeterminate. Intuitively, total welfare should always increase with eﬃciency
gains. Appendix A.3 shows that this is not true, even when the products are strategic
complements and the best reply map is a contraction.
The linearity of demand is, therefore, not suﬃcient to rule out counter-intuitive situa-
tions. In contrast to the surprising properties of the ﬁrst derivatives, Proposition 1 yields
clear-cut results for the curvature of consumers’ surplus and proﬁts. The linearity of de-
mand implies that competition authorities should love the risk related to the magnitude
of eﬃciency gains (irrespective of the relative weights assigned to consumers and ﬁrms).
Next, we turn to more general demand functions.
7The middle term, which is the derivative of the insider’s proﬁt, can be negative, as shown in Appen-
dix A.2.
104 Mergers to monopoly
In this section, we examine the attitude towards risk for mergers that lead to a monopoly
(I = N), that is, the case where unilateral eﬀects are expected to be the strongest. On
the contrary, Section 5 posits Bertrand competition with homogenous products before and
after the merger, that is, the weakest unilateral eﬀects. Both sections can thus be thought
of as complementary. These restrictions allow to carry out the analysis for general demand
functions.
Lemma 2 (Convexity of monopoly proﬁts). The equilibrium monopoly proﬁt is a convex
function of the magnitude of the eﬃciency gains.





. As c(γ) is an aﬃne
function of γ, ΠI (γ) is convex in γ as a maximum of aﬃne functions.
Lemma 2 shows that for any demand functions, the monopoly’s proﬁt is convex in γ.
That is, ﬁrms are willing to take risks to create a monopoly.8 For a given mean, say zero,
they are ready to accept a large variance.
To derive speciﬁc results on consumers’ surplus for general demand functions, we pos-
tulate a symmetric environnement.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry). Before and after the merger, consumers perceive brands sym-
metrically. All marginal costs of production are identical.
Given the symmetry of demand functions in p1,..., pn, it is readily conﬁrmed that at
the optimum: p1 = ... = pn. Therefore there is no loss of generality in assuming that the
merged entity maximizes its proﬁt under the constraint that p1 = ... = pn = p. Let Φ be
the Chamberlin’s DD curve, i.e. the demand function for one product when all prices are
equal (see e.g. Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001))
Φ(p) = Di (p,...,p).
Then the post-merger proﬁt function is:
ΠI (p) = n[p − (1 − γ)c]Φ(p).
Let p(γ) be the post-merger monopoly price. Hereafter, we continue to note with a dot
derivatives with respect to γ (e.g. ˙ p) and with a prime derivatives w.r.t. the price (e.g. Φ0).
Deﬁnition 1. Let ε(p) = −
pΦ0
Φ denote the price elasticity of the demand function Φ and let
E(p) =
pΦ00
Φ0 denote the price elasticity of Φ0 the derivative of the demand function. Finally
let Ψ(p) = E/ε be the ratio of both elasticities.
Appendix D.1 shows that Ψ(p) is nothing but the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand curve, evaluated at Φ(p). Appendix D.2 presents the ﬁrst-order condition of the
monopoly problem and checks that the second-order condition is satisﬁed if and only if
Ψ(p(γ)) + 2 > 0. Appendix D.3 computes the second-order derivatives of consumers’
surplus and ﬁrms proﬁts, and establishes the following result.
8This is consistent with the high number of mergers that destroy value observed in practice.
11Lemma 3. The welfare function Wα is strictly convex at γ if and only if
αΨ0
2 + Ψ




where Ψ,Ψ0 and ε are evaluated at p(γ).
Because of the second-order condition, the bracketed term in (9) is strictly positive,
which yields Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If Ψ is nondecreasing with p, then, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the objective Wα is
globally convex in γ.
Proposition 2 characterizes a large class of demand functions for which Wα is globally
convex. In consequence, for this class, for a given mean, uncertainty about eﬃciency gains
raises the expected value of Wα.
As a ﬁrst illustration of Proposition 2, suppose goods are homogenous and demand
is given by (a − bp)β, with βb > 0. In this case, the function Ψ is constant and equal
to (1 − β)/β. When β / ∈ [−1,0], the second-order condition Ψ + 2 > 0 is satisﬁed and
Proposition 2 applies. Similarly, if Φ = Aexp[a − bp] (A, b > 0), then Ψ = −1. Next,
we present examples with imperfect substitutes. First, we consider constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) demand system (see Vives (1999), pages 147-148)










with 0 < βθ < 1, β ≤ 1 and θ < 1. The elasticity of substitution, deﬁned as the derivative
of ln(Di/Dj) with respect to ln(pi/pj), is 1/(1 − β). For β = 1, goods are homogenous.
Corollary 1 (Constant elasticity of substitution). If the demands Di exhibit a constant-
elasticity of substitution, then Ψ0 = 0, and therefore Wα is globally convex in γ, for all
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.





whence we deduce that: Ψ = −2 + βθ > −2. The function Ψ is constant and the second-
order conditions are satisﬁed. Proposition 2 applies.
Next, we turn to the symmetric Logit demand system with an outside option9
Di(p1,...,pn) =
exp(−pi/σ)
exp(−p0/σ) + ... + exp(−pn/σ)





9See Werden and Froeb (1994) for a thorough study of mergers relying on the Logit model.
12A simple change of variables shows that the monopoly price p(γ) is such that p(γ)/σ only
depends on c/σ and p0/σ. After the merger, the market share covered by the monopolist
is nΦ(p(γ)).
Lemma 4. With a Logit symmetric demand, the objective Wα is a convex function of γ if
and only if the market coverage by the monopolist is lower than 1/(2α).
Proof. It is readily conﬁrmed that





nexp[(p0 − p)/σ] + 1
.
Straightforward computations show that (9) writes: exp[(p − p0)/σ] > n(2α − 1), which is
equivalent to nΦ(p(γ)) < 1/(2α).
Since the market coverage is lower than 100 %, the following corollary obtains.
Corollary 2. Suppose α ≤ 1/2. With a Logit symmetric demand, the objective Wα is
globally (strictly) convex in γ.
Corollary 2 implies in particular that the total welfare is globally convex in γ (case
α = 1/2). Next, we analyze the curvature of the consumers’ surplus S (case α = 1). Here,
we get only local results around ˆ γ1. Recall that ˆ γ1 is the critical threshold for eﬃciency
gains associated with the consumers’ surplus. Appendix D.4 shows that
Corollary 3. With a Logit symmetric demand, the consumers’ surplus is locally convex at










The set of parameters deﬁned by condition (10) must be compared to the admissible
region, namely the set of (c/σ,p0/σ) for which eﬃciency gains are potentially able to oﬀset
unilateral eﬀects. The admissible region, depicted on Figure 1, is located below the curve
ˆ γ1 (c/σ,p0/σ) = 1 corresponding to 100 % gains. For eﬃciency gains to be able to com-
pensate the unilateral eﬀect, the outside good must be suﬃciently attractive (p0/σ not too
high) and the potential for cost reduction must be suﬃciently high (c/σ not too small).
The straight line ¨ S (ˆ γ1) = 0 splits the admissible region in two areas where the consumers’
surplus is locally concave (resp. convex) at ˆ γ1.10 This example shows that no general
conclusion as to the curvature of the consumers’ surplus can be drawn.
Lemma 5. Eﬃciency gains can oﬀset the unilateral eﬀect if only if
p0 ≤ p+(c) + σ ln

p+(c) − (σ + c)
















10For n = 2, the curves ˆ γ1 = 1 and ¨ S (ˆ γ1) = 0 intersect at c/σ = 2/3 and p0/σ = 2 − ln2. As a
consequence, for any admissible set of parameter (c,p0,σ) satisfying p0 ≤ 1.3 σ, the consumers’ surplus is
locally convex at ˆ γ1.






S (ˆ γ 1) < 0
¨ S (ˆ γ1) > 0
ˆ γ1 = 1
¨ S (ˆ γ1) = 0
Figure 1: Curvature of consumers’ surplus S at ˆ γ1 (symmetric Logit demand system, n = 2)
5 Mergers without any unilateral eﬀect
After having investigated mergers leading to monopolies, we turn to situations where, on
the contrary, the post-merger environment is highly competitive. To this end, we assume
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, the ﬁercest kind of competition. In par-
ticular, if ﬁrms share the same technology, prices are driven down to the common marginal
cost of production. Yet, thanks to a merger, a ﬁrm can obtain some market power if
its marginal cost becomes lower than that of its competitors. Since we are interested in
post-merger competitive environments, we impose that, after the merger, each ﬁrm exerts
competitive pressure on the others. That is, we rule out drastic eﬃciency gains and losses.
Formally, let c be the common pre-merger constant marginal cost. After the merger,
the marginal cost of the merged entity amounts to (1 − γ)c with γ ≤ 1. The marginal cost
of the outsider(s) remains at c. We note pm (.) the (unconstrained) monopoly price as a
function of the marginal cost: pm (c) = argmaxp (p − c)D(p) and we adopt the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. Eﬃciency gains and losses are (almost) never drastic, i.e. the inequalities
c ≤ pm ((1 − γ)c) and (1 − γ)c ≤ pm (c)
hold (almost) everywhere on the support of the random variable γ.
14Suppose that n mono-product and symmetric ﬁrms initially compete à la Bertrand
and consider a merger involving l insiders, with l ≤ n − 1. Absent eﬃciency gain or
loss, the consumers’ surplus remains unchanged, as well as the industry’s proﬁt (still at
zero). There is no unilateral eﬀect. In our notations: ˆ γ1 = 0. Moreover, when there
are two or more outsiders (l ≤ n − 2) and as long as Assumption 2 holds, the merger
leaves the price unchanged, irrespective of the sign and magnitude of eﬃciency gains. In
particular, eﬃciency losses, if any, play no role. Society beneﬁts from eﬃciency gains (which
are, however, entirely kept by the merged entity), but cannot suﬀer from eﬃciency losses.
Things are diﬀerent when the merger creates an asymmetric duopoly (l = n − 1). Here,
consumers and society as a whole suﬀer from eﬃciency losses. We now concentrate on this
case.
Under Assumption 2, all sales are made by the ﬁrm with the lowest marginal cost and the
post merger equilibrium price is the largest one: p(γ) = max{c,(1 − γ)c}. Figure 2 depicts
the post-merger ﬁrms’ proﬁts, consumers’ surplus and total welfare 2W1/2 as functions of γ.
From the expression of p(γ), it is transparent that the price cannot decrease and therefore
consumers’ surplus cannot increase. As soon as there is a positive probability that γ < 0,
it is even worse: consumers’ surplus decreases in expectation. That is, in this set-up,
eﬃciency gains are never passed on to consumers, but eﬃciency losses are. Such a merger
would not be allowed by antitrust authorities, should they care only about consumers’
surplus (α = 1). On the other hand, as soon as authorities recognize that ﬁrms beneﬁt







Figure 2: Proﬁts, consumers’ surplus and total welfare for a Bertrand duopoly
Proposition 3. Under Bertrand competition and Assumption 2, there exists a threshold
value ˆ α ∈ (1/2,2/3] such that, for all α ≤ ˆ α, any merger creating a duopoly and satisfying
15Eγ = 0 raises the expected value of the objective function Wα. Formally
Eγ (Wα) ≥ Wα(Eγ) = Wα(0) = Wpre
α . (13)
Proposition 3 establishes that if a weight large enough is put on ﬁrms and if eﬃciency
gains are zero in expectation (Eγ = 0 = ˆ γ1), then uncertainty of eﬃciency gains is welcomed.
The proof, in Appendix E, shows that ˆ α = [D(c) + D(pm(c))]/[2D(c) + D(pm(c))].
The inequality (13) does not follow from Jensen’s lemma since the objective function
Wα is not globally convex in γ (see Figure 2). It may, however, be locally convex around
ˆ γ1 = 0. More precisely, Figure 2 shows that the industry’s proﬁt ΠInsider + ΠOutsider has
a convex kink at 0, while the consumers’ surplus has a concave kink at 0. It is easy to
check that the right and left derivatives of Wα at 0 are (1 − α)cD(c) and (2α − 1)cD(c)
respectively. Therefore, Wα has a convex kink at 0 if and only if α ≤ 2/3. It follows that,
for any α ≤ 2/3, it exists η > 0 such that, if the random variable γ has zero mean and takes
its values in [−η,η], then the merger raises Eγ (Wα). Proposition 3 introduces a threshold
ˆ α ≤ 2/3 such that this “convexity-like” property is valid without any restriction on the
support of γ (besides Assumption 2).
Finally, note that b α is always (strictly) larger than 1/2: from the ex ante point of view, a
merger with zero eﬃciency gains in expectation raises the standard welfare criterion, which
puts equal weights to ﬁrms and consumers.
6 Mergers under Cournot competition
In this section, we examine the eﬀects of uncertainty of eﬃciency gains for mergers when
ﬁrms compete à la Cournot. Costs are asymmetric and mergers under consideration involve
an arbitrary number of parties, 2 ≤ l ≤ n. All notations used below have been introduced
in Section 2.
After the merger, the r outsiders use the same technology as before, while the merged
entity enjoys a marginal cost of (1 − γ)cI, where cI denotes the marginal cost of the merged
entity absent eﬃciency gains (γ = 0). In the spirit of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we
distinguish cost reductions due to the reallocation of production, which lead to cI, from the
ones linked to eﬃciency gains, which lead to (1−γ)cI. In the Cournot model with constant
return to scale, a merger of two (or more) asymmetric ﬁrms should, in principle, lead to
the closing of the less eﬃcient insider(s). In that case, cI would be equal to the smallest
marginal cost among insiders’. Yet, such a rationalization of the production might not be
achievable by the merging ﬁrms, so we assume cI ≥ mini∈I ci but we do not a priori impose
equality.
The inverse demand curve is denoted P (Q), where Q is the sum of the quantities
produced by all ﬁrms. Let Q(γ) denote the equilibrium quantity after the merger. From
now on, a prime is used for derivatives with respect to quantity (e.g. P0), while the dot
still indicates a derivative w.r.t. γ (e.g. ˙ Q). The elasticity Θ(Q) = QP00 (Q)/P0 (Q) of the
slope of the inverse demand function plays a crucial role in the analysis. When evaluated at
Q = Φ(p), it corresponds to the function Ψ(p) used in Section 4. The assumption Θ+2 > 0
16ensures that the maximization problem of each ﬁrm is concave (for any conﬁguration of the
industry). By adding the f.o.c. of each ﬁrm, we check that Q(γ) is the unique solution to




where J denotes the set of outsiders. Lemma 6 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for eﬃciency gains to be able to compensate unilateral eﬀects. This condition only depends
on the pre-merger price and on the sum of the marginal costs of the insiders before the
merger.
Lemma 6 (Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Proposition 1). Let ppre denote the pre-merger
equilibrium price. Eﬃciency gains are able to oﬀset the unilateral eﬀects of the merger




ppre ≤ 1. (15)
Proof. The pre-merger equilibrium quantity Qpre is solution to nP (Q)+QP0 (Q) =
P
k∈N ck.
Noting ppre = P(Qpre) the pre-merger price, we get: QpreP0 (Qpre) =
P
k∈N ck −nppre. Us-
ing (14), it is straightforward that the price after the merger is exactly equal to ppre if and
only if cIγ = (l − 1)ppre −
P
i∈I ci + cI. The condition γ ≤ 1 leads to (15).
For the inequality (15) to hold, insiders should not be too eﬃcient11 before the merger.
Absent eﬃciency gains, the merger harms consumers (See Farrell and Shapiro (1990),
Proposition 2). That is, the merger is harmful (due to unilateral eﬀects) but if (15)
holds, amendable (thanks to eﬃciency gains). The critical threshold ˆ γ1 is, then, given





i∈I ppre − ci.
The eﬀect of the uncertainty about γ on the expected value of the consumers’ surplus
remains linked to the curvature of S with respect to γ.
Lemma 7. The consumers’ surplus is locally convex at γ if and only if
1 −
QΘ0
r + 2 + Θ
> 0. (16)
Lemma 7, proved in Appendix F, parallels Lemma 3 of Section 4. Both results coincide
exactly when we look at the consumers’ surplus for mergers that create a monopoly (replace
r by 0 in Equation (16) and α by 1 in Equation (9)). This similarity is not coincidental, as
a monopoly selling an homogeneous good can equivalently maximize in price or quantity.
Recall, however, that in this section (contrary to Section 4), ﬁrms do not share the same
technology and the mergers under consideration do not necessarily create a monopoly.
Proposition 4. If Θ is non increasing in Q and larger than -2, then the consumers’ surplus
is globally convex in γ (¨ S > 0).
11In particular, if all marginal costs equal c, then (15) writes
ppre−c
ppre ≤ 1/l. If, in addition, demand is
linear (P = a − bQ), then (15) becomes c ≥ (l − 1)a/(n + l), which deﬁnes a lower bound for c.
17Proposition 4, which follow directly from condition (16), applies to a large class of
demand functions. A subclass of interest consists of demand functions such that the function
Θ is constant and larger than -2 (to ensure that the second-order conditions hold). This
family is described by three parameters:








with −2 < θ 6= −1 and b < 0. If θ > −1, the intercept a must be positive to get a positive
demand. If θ < −1, a must be negative to guarantee that the demand tends to zero as the
price goes to inﬁnity. For θ = −1, we deﬁne
P(Q) = max{a + bLog(Q);0},
with a > 0 and b < 0. This family contains demands with constant elasticity, P (Q) =
a−bεQ−1/ε, with ε > 1 (take θ = −(1 + 1/ε)). For all demands in this family, the function
Θ is equal to the constant θ and Proposition 4 applies. Another particular case encompassed
in this family is the linear demand (θ = 0) for which the curvature of the proﬁt functions
can also be determined.
Lemma 8. If demand is linear, P = a − bQ, with a,b > 0, then, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the
objective function Wα is globally convex in γ.
Proof. The equilibrium proﬁt of any ﬁrm writes Πk = b
 
qk2 where qk is linear w.r.t.
marginal costs. Therefore, all proﬁt functions are convex in γ. Proposition 4 shows that S
is convex, therefore Wα is convex as a combination of convex functions.
To summarize, in the Cournot environment with asymmetric costs and an arbitrary
number of outsiders, the post-merger consumers’ surplus appears to be a convex function
of the eﬃciency gains for a large family of demand functions. The curvature of the proﬁts
function is harder to characterize. For linear demand, the convexity of proﬁts hold.
7 Lessons for merger control
The analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoﬀ between unilateral eﬀects and eﬃ-
ciency gains. This article examines the role of uncertainty (on eﬃciency gains) in such a
tradeoﬀ. Common wisdom is that antitrust authorities should be very cautious about ran-
dom gains. Our results show that dismissing eﬃciency gains on the sole ground that they
are uncertain would not be theoretically founded. Indeed, the attitude towards uncertainty
depends on the curvature of the social objective function. We have exhibited a number of
situations where the objective is convex in the eﬃciency gains, implying that competition
authorities should welcome the risk for a given expectation of eﬃciency gains.
In particular, we have shown that the linearity of demand ensures the convexity of proﬁts
and consumers’ surplus in an otherwise general price competition setup. When mergers
create a monopoly, the proﬁt is always convex in the eﬃciency gains; the consumers surplus
18is convex for CES demand systems; total welfare is convex for a Logit demand. When the
merger creates a duopoly and goods are homogenous, a convexity-like result holds for total
welfare (for any demand function). When ﬁrms compete in quantity with asymmetric costs,
the consumers’ surplus is convex in eﬃciency gains for a large class of demand functions.
This is not to say that the convexity property is general. The Logit example shows that, for
a merger to monopoly, the consumers’ surplus can be locally convex or concave, depending
on the precise value of the underlying structural parameters.
The article provides some guidance for empirical merger analysis. Our results imply
that functional speciﬁcations may entail implicit restrictions on the attitude towards risk
regarding the magnitude of eﬃciency gains. When two diﬀerent demand systems ﬁt the
data equally well, welfare could be convex in one case but concave in the other. In the
former case, it is more likely that eﬃciency gains are found to compensate the unilateral
eﬀect than in the latter case.
Merging parties commonly provide authorities with econometric studies tending to show
that the unilateral eﬀects of the merger are weak and will be oﬀset by modest eﬃciency
gains. Typically, these studies estimate structural oligopolistic models and use these es-
timations to simulate the post-merger market equilibrium under various assumptions. A
huge body of empirical literature has grown, estimating unilateral eﬀects for mergers in
various industries: see, among others, Nevo (2000) in the U.S. ready-to-eat cereals indus-
try, Focarelli and Panetta (2003) in the Italian bank sector, Pinkse and Slade (2004) in the
U.K. beer industry, and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) for the European truck industry. These
studies allow to estimate critical thresholds for the magnitude of eﬃciency gains, i.e. lower
bounds for gains to oﬀset unilateral eﬀects.
Empirical studies, of course, account for uncertainty in the environment, by using error
terms in the demand or cost equations. Note, however, that the uncertainty about eﬃciency
gains is of a diﬀerent nature than that of demand. Eﬃciency gains aﬀect future costs and
are therefore impossible or extremely diﬃcult to estimate ex ante. Empirical studies usually
provide point estimate for the threshold above which eﬃciency gains oﬀset unilateral eﬀect.
When the social objective is convex in the eﬃciency gains and they are not certain, a point
estimate of the critical threshold overestimates the necessary gains and might lead to block
welfare-enhancing mergers (type I errors).12 On the other hand, when the social objective
is concave the threshold is underestimated and welfare-deteriorating mergers might be au-
thorized (type II errors). Our results suggest that presenting the objective as a function of
future costs might yield a more accurate idea of the market after the merger.
It would be of interest to extend our analysis to situations where the merging ﬁrms do
not know the exact value of the post-merger cost, but have a better information about its
distribution than the authorities (in the spirit of Besanko and Spulber (1993) or Lagerlöf and
12For instance, Pinkse and Slade (2004) use a linear demand system to evaluate the impact of mergers in
the U.K. brewing industry. They write page 641 that “the costs of the merging ﬁrms would have to fall by
about 20 % to just oﬀset the increase in market power.” They conclude that “a reduction of the required
magnitude would not have been possible”. Their calculation is done under the implicit assumption that γ
is perfectly known. Under the chosen speciﬁcation, we have seen that consumers’ surplus is convex. If they
had allowed γ to be distributed over an interval, the convexity of S would have implied a requirement for
the expectation of eﬃciency gains lower than 20 %.
19Heidhues (2005)). Our results might help to better understand the information disclosure
issue in such cases. Although this article focuses on horizontal mergers, the argument
applies to any situations with a market power - eﬃciency tradeoﬀ. Williamson (1968) points
dissolution, vertical and conglomerate mergers. Many other practices under the scrutiny of
antitrust authorities (e.g. joint-ventures, collusion, bundling) give rise to such tradeoﬀs. In
all these cases, the curvature of the social objective plays a crucial role whenever eﬃciencies
are uncertain.
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Appendix
A Some properties of mergers under price competition
In this Appendix, we present three counter-intuitive properties of mergers when ﬁrms com-
pete in prices. The examples below rely on linear demand systems, which are analyzed
systematically in Section 3 and Appendix C. For all examples, we have checked that (i) the
demand is consistent with a well-posed consumer’s problem (see Remark 1), (ii) there ex-
ists a unique Nash equilibrium, (iii) all varieties are produced at the pre- and post-merger
equilibria, (iv) the varieties are strategic complements and (v) the best reply map is a
contraction. (See Lemma 1, Appendix C and Footnote 16 for more details.)
21A.1 A merger without eﬃciency gains can raise total welfare
When ﬁrms compete in price and varieties are strategic substitutes, it is well-known that
a merger can reduce price and raise total welfare.13 We show in this section that this may
also happen for substitute goods under strategic complementarity. The intuition goes as
follows. A merger might involve relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms whose goods are (relatively) not
valued much by consumers and (relatively) distinct from outsiders’ goods. As a result of
the merger, all prices increase but the outsiders’ prices increase less than insiders’ ones.
Therefore, while the quantities produced by the insiders decrease, some of the quantities
produced by the outsiders might increase. If one of the outsider is very eﬃcient, the merger
shifts production from ineﬃcient ﬁrms to an eﬃcient one, which reduces total costs of
production. This gain might be greater than consumers’ loss due to higher prices.




D1 = 10 − p1 + 1
2p2 + 1
20p3
D2 = 10 + 1
2p1 − p2 + 1
20p3
D3 = 10,000 + 1
20p1 + 1
20p2 − p3.
Assume that the marginal costs of production are
c1 = c2 = 9 and c3 = 0.























Consumers’ surplus is Spre = −37,622,304.2, while total welfare is W
pre
1/2 = −12,474,176.1.






















After the merger, consumers’ surplus is S = −37,669,283.4, while total welfare is W1/2 =
−12,470,906.7. The merger increases welfare by 3,269.4. Moreover, it is privately proﬁtable
and, as expected, consumers’ surplus is reduced.
A.2 The proﬁt of the merged entity can decrease with eﬃciency gains
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. Eﬃciency gains are not identical for all
the varieties produced by the merged entity. Some marginal costs might (almost) not
13For instance, two ﬁrms selling complementary goods exert a negative price externality on each other.
If they merge, they reduce prices and at the same time earn more proﬁt. This property is known as the
Cournot eﬀect.
22be aﬀected by the merger while others might be signiﬁcantly reduced. The prices of all
products, however, decline after the merger as soon as some eﬃciency gains exist. That
is, the proﬁt margin of the merged entity might decline for some of its products and these
proﬁt losses might not be compensated by gains on other brands. To illustrate, take n = 3








D2 = 10 + 1
5,000p1 − p2 + 9
20p3
D3 = 10 + 9
20p1 + 9
20p2 − p3
Assume that the marginal costs of production are
c1 = 0, and c2 = c3 = 5.























Consumers’ surplus is Spre = −475,372; total welfare is W
pre
1/2 = −116,629.
Suppose that ﬁrms 1 and 2 merge and generate eﬃciency gains: c2(γ) = 5(1 − γ). For




















, S = −475,386,
and W1/2 = −116,628. Therefore total welfare decreased by 13.94 after the merger, which
is privately proﬁtable.
It is readily conﬁrmed14 that, for γ = ˆ γ1 ≈ 4.1%, consumers’ surplus is unaﬀected by
the merger, Π1+2 = 326,690, Π3 = 32,058 and W = −116,624 > −116,629. That is, the
merger beneﬁts society as a whole, consumers are indiﬀerent (they might be made slightly
better of), the merged entity proﬁt increases and the outsider proﬁt decreases. Yet, this
merger is problematic because the proﬁt of the merged entity Π1+2 ≈ 326,690.15−8.61γ +
5.58γ2 is a decreasing function of γ, for γ ∈ [0,0.77]. Once the merger is authorized,
the merged entity would have no incentive to implement the eﬃciency gains (it seems
reasonable to assume that while the merged entity cannot achieve gains greater than γ,
it could nevertheless achieve gains lower than γ). But, absent eﬃciency gains, consumers’
surplus and total welfare would fall (relatively to the pre-merger situation). If the merging
ﬁrms cannot credibly commit to reduce their costs, antitrust authorities should block a
would be proﬁtable merger. All this has a prisoner dilemma ﬂavor.
14S ≈ −475,386.00 + 340.34γ + 2.88γ
2.
23A.3 Total welfare can decrease with eﬃciency gains
Take n = 4 monoproduct ﬁrms, and consider the following demand system:

   
   
D1 = 5.106 − p1 + 99
100p3 + 1
10,000p4
D2 = 1 − p2 + 1
1,000p3 + 4
5p4
D3 = 10 + 99
100p1 + 1
1,000p2 − p3
D4 = 10 + 1
10,000p1 + 4
5p2 − p4
Assume that the marginal costs of production are
c1 = c3 = c4 = 0 and c2 = 1/2.
As D1 (resp. D2) is independent of p2 (resp. p1), for γ = ˆ γ1 = 0, the post-merger Nash
equilibrium is identical to the pre-merger Nash equilibrium (no unilateral eﬀects):





















Firms 1 and 2 merge and generate eﬃciency gains: c2(γ) = (1 − γ)/2. The post-merger
total welfare is given by
W1/2 (γ) ≈ −1.45.1012 − 6.72γ + 0.078γ2
which is a non increasing function of γ for γ ∈ ]−∞,1] (if γ is too negative, brand 2 is no
longer produced). Thus, total welfare is decreasing in the magnitude of eﬃciency gains on
the whole relevant range, that is, up to 100 % gains. Note that in this example, the proﬁt
Π1+2 of the merged entity is also a non increasing function of γ. The merger is, however,
privately beneﬁcial from an ex ante perspective if the ﬁrms’ expectations put enough weight
on γ < 0.
B Preliminary results on the proﬁt functions
For an outsider: First note that from the f.o.c. ΠJ
J = 0 it follows that
ΠJ
JJ ˙ pJ + ΠJ








˙ pH where H = N \ J . (17)
Now, diﬀerentiating ΠJ w.r.t. γ (using the envelope theorem)yields: ˙ ΠJ = ΠJ
H ˙ pH. Diﬀer-









HH ˙ pH + ΠJ
H ¨ pH
which, combined to (17), gives (4).
24For the insider: from the f.o.c. ΠI
I = 0 and using ΠI
Ic = −DI
I = VII it follows that
ΠI
II ˙ pI + ΠI
















where K = N \ I. Now, diﬀerentiating ΠI w.r.t. γ and using the envelope theorem, it





K ˙ pK. Diﬀerentiating once more, using (18) and rearranging







































where K = N \ I.
C Linear demand system
In this section, we derive the best reply maps for linear demand systems and solve for the
Nash equilibrium prices. Then, we examine the variations of prices and consumers’ surplus
with the magnitude of eﬃciency gains.
C.1 Best reply map and Nash equilibrium prices
Let ∆ denote the block diagonal matrix, whose blocks are DK
K, K = I,J1,...,Jr and let
In denote the n × n identity matrix. The matrix ∆ has the same properties as the matrix
B: it is symmetric negative deﬁnite.




−1 DK that is:
m + ∆−1D = 0 or p − c + ∆−1 (Bp + A) = 0.
It follows that the best reply map, which gives prices of each ﬁrm as functions of the prices







∆−1A + Rp, (20)





Note that the diagonal blocks of the matrix R are zero, so that each price given by (20)
only depends on the prices of goods controlled by other ﬁrms.15 Strategic complementarity
is equivalent to each term of R being non negative.
The Nash equilibrium vector price is deﬁned by: p = R(p). So there exists a unique
interior equilibrium if and only if the matrix In − R is nonsingular and the demand is










H for K 6= H, K,H = I,J1,...,Jr.
25positive for each good at the solution to p = R(p). The Nash equilibrium vector price is
given by












(In − R)−1˙ c. (22)
It follows that ˙ p 6= 0 unless if ˙ c = 0.
C.2 First derivative properties (proof of Lemma 1)
In this subsection, we assume that the best reply map R(.) is a contraction. This is
















˙ c ≤ 0 (23)
since all elements of R are nonnegative (strategic complementarity) and all components
of ˙ c are nonpositive. It follows that the consumers’ surplus (the proﬁt of each outsider J
respectively) is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) in γ:





which completes the proof of Lemma 1. Note that the contraction assumption and the
strategic complementarity are only suﬃcient assumptions for these results to hold.
C.3 Multidimensional gains
In this subsection, we note d
dγ and d2
dγ2 the ﬁrst and second derivatives of a scalar function
with respect to the vector γ of eﬃciency gains. For instance, dS
dγ is a column vector of size
l and d2S
dγ2 is a symmetric l×l matrix, where l is the number of goods controlled by the new














16A matrix norm is deﬁned as 9R9 = supkx k≤1 k Rx k, where k . k stands for any norm of R
n. For
instance, consider the norm: k x k∞= maxi |xi|. The associated matrix norm is 9R9∞ = maxi
P
j |rij|,
where rij is the generic element of R. Using this norm, we checked that the best reply maps in all three
examples of Appendix A are contractions.




dγi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l,1 ≤ j ≤ n. (We use
dp
dγ0 for
the transposed matrix of
dp0
dγ .) Since D is symmetric negative deﬁnite, the l ×l matrix d2S
dγ2











As in the one-dimensional case, the convexity results follow from the concavity of demand.
D Merger to monopoly
D.1 The Ψ function




















where Θ(Q) = QP00 (Q)/P0 (Q). In words, Ψ(p) is the elasticity of the slope P0 (Q) of the
inverse demand function, evaluated at Q = Φ(p).
D.2 First and second order conditions
The ﬁrst order condition of the monopolist’s problem ∂ΠI
∂p = 0 writes:
Φ(p) + [p − (1 − γ)c]Φ0 (p) = 0 or






The second order condition ∂2ΠI
∂p2 < 0 writes:
2Φ0 (p) + (p − (1 − γ)c)Φ00 (p) < 0 or







It follows that the second-order condition is satisﬁed at the solution to (24) if and only if
E > −2ε or Ψ > −2.
D.3 Convexity of S and Wα
The ﬁrst derivatives of the consumers’ surplus and the monopolist’s proﬁt are:
˙ S (γ) = −n˙ pΦ(p) and ˙ ΠI (γ) = ncΦ(p).
27The second derivatives are:
¨ S (γ) = −n¨ pΦ(p) − n˙ p2Φ0 (p) and ¨ ΠI (γ) = nc˙ pΦ0(p).














Using (27), ¨ S becomes:
















¨ ΠI (γ) = nc˙ pΦ0(p) = n˙ p2Φ(2 + Ψ)
ε
p
The second derivative of the welfare function is obtained by combining ¨ S and ¨ Π.
D.4 Proof of Corollary 3 and Lemma 5
First we prove Lemma 5. Note that for a Logit demand, ∂Di/∂pi = −Di  
1 − Di
/σ
which simpliﬁes the f.o.c. Let ppre denote the pre-merger Nash equilibrium price, namely
the solution to
(p − c)(1 − Φ(p)) = σ.
Since (p−c)(1−Φ(p)) increases in p, we know that ppre/σ increases in c/σ and p0/σ. The
post merger price p(γ) is solution to
[p − (1 − γ)c](1 − nΦ(p)) = σ.
Therefore, eﬃciency gains can oﬀset the unilateral eﬀect if and only if there exists γ ≤ 1
such that
(ppre − (1 − γ)c)(1 − nΦ(ppre)) = σ,
which is equivalent to (taking the value of the left hand side for γ = 1)
ppre(1 − nΦ(ppre)) ≥ σ,
and, using the pre-merger f.o.c. (ppre − c)(1 − Φ(ppre)) = σ to eliminate Φ, it comes
−(ppre)




28Let p+(c) denote the largest solution of the equation −p2 + (σ + c)p + σc
n−1 = 0 (the
lowest solution is negative). The expression of p+(c) is given by (12). Condition (28) is
equivalent to ppre ≤ p+ which (using the fact that (p − c)(1 − Φ) is an increasing function
of p) is equivalent to
(p+(c) − c)[1 − Φ(p+(c))] ≥ σ,
which simpliﬁes to prove (11) and completes the proof of Lemma 5. We turn now to
Corollary 3.
By Lemma 4, the consumers’ surplus S = W1 is convex at ˆ γ1 if and only if Φ(p(ˆ γ1)) ≤
1/(2n). By deﬁnition of ˆ γ1: p(ˆ γ1) = ppre. Now observe that the function ϕ(.) deﬁned by
ϕ(c) = Φ(ppre(c)) is decreasing. Therefore the condition Φ(ppre) < 1/(2n) is equivalent to
c > c = ϕ−1 (1/(2n)). The equation ϕ(c) = 1/(2n) combined with (ppre−c)(1−Φ(ppre)) =
σ gives the value of c and proves (10).
E Bertrand competition with homogenous goods
This section presents a proof of Proposition 3. Before the merger, the objective is W
pre
α =
αS(c). After the merger, the objective is given by
Wα(γ) =

αS(c) + (1 − α)γcD(c) if γ ≥ 0
αS((1 − γ)c) − (1 − α)γcD((1 − γ)c) if γ ≤ 0.
The convexity of the consumers’ surplus and the identity S0(p) = −D(p) yield, for
γ ≤ 0:
S((1 − γ)c) − S(c) ≥ D(c)γc. (29)
Let F be the cumulative distribution function of the random variable γ. Using succes-





γ≤0 γdF(γ) = 0, we get
















{α[S((1 − γ)c) − S(c)] − (1 − α)γcD((1 − γ)c)}dF(γ)






{αγcD(c) − (1 − α)γcD(pm(c))}dF(γ)













P(u)du − P (Q(γ))Q(γ)
whence
˙ S (γ) = − ˙ QQP0 (Q).
From




it follows that (by diﬀerentiating with respect to γ)
− ˙ QP0 (Q) =
cI
r + 2 + Θ(Q)
therefore, ˙ S becomes
˙ S =
cIQ
r + 2 + Θ(Q)
and
¨ S (γ) =
cI ˙ Q
r + 2 + Θ(Q)
+
−cIQ ˙ QΘ0








r + 2 + Θ(Q)

.
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